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Abstract: In a possible sign of a new trend in Southeast Asia, economic pressures are driving smallholder
shrimp farmers from Vietnam’s Mekong Delta across the Cambodian border in search of new land. Building
from ethnographic research with Vietnamese shrimp farmers in Kampot province, Cambodia, this paper
explores the structures, mechanisms and relations that facilitate and impede the ability of Vietnamese
migrants to gain and maintain access to land in Cambodia. The Vietnamese migrants in our study bring
capital and farming skills, but their ambiguous legal status and their lack of social networks and experience
with the terms of access in Cambodia render them vulnerable to exclusion and dependent on a local broker
to mediate their interactions with landowners and authorities. We recount the migrants’ attempts to
overcome the uncertainty of their mediated access by bypassing the broker and cultivating direct social ties
with Khmer villagers, border authorities and the landowners themselves. This study generates new insights
into the dynamics of cross-border livelihoods in mainland Southeast Asia and more broadly illuminates the
central importance of migrant–broker relationships and migrant agency in seeking to overcome
dependency on brokers by forging new social relations in border areas.
Keywords:
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Introduction
This paper examines the phenomenon of crossborder livelihoods from the perspective of
migrant land users, looking at the particular challenges that Vietnamese migrants face in negotiating access to land in Cambodia. Building on an
ethnographic case study of a single border
village in Kampot province, we examine the ways
in which Vietnamese migrants seek to navigate
powers of exclusion and secure access to land,
paying particular attention to the role that the border plays in facilitating their exclusion and the role
of key intermediaries in controlling migrants’ access to land and to political authority (Figs 1–3).
As Hall (2013: 1590) notes, farmers have
historically migrated great distances in search
of land, especially in Southeast Asia, and there
is reason to believe that this trend will intensify
in the future, as economic pressures put increasing strain on the livelihoods of smallholders
across the region. These migrant land users,
however, remain understudied, as do the brokers

and middlemen that facilitate their acquisition of
land and their cross-border mobility. While
much of the recent scholarship on cross-border
livelihoods in the region focuses on the privileged
access of ‘border people’ with the ethnic and kin
connections and experience to navigate borderlands (Schoenberger and Turner, 2008; Sturgeon,
2013), the farmers in this study are largely from
distant provinces and until recently did not imagine that they would be engaged in cross-border
livelihoods. These migrants bring farming skills
and capital, but their ambiguous legal status and
their lack of social networks and experience with
the terms of access in Cambodia render them vulnerable to exclusion and dependent on local brokers to mediate their interactions with
landowners and authorities.
The paper begins by bringing together literature
on land and property relations, borders, migration
and brokerage to illuminate the underlying
precarity of migrant land access and the vulnerability to exclusion that derives from their
dependence on brokers and intermediaries,
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both in navigating land markets and border
landscapes.1 We then provide a brief overview
of the study site and research methodology before proceeding to the body of the case study,
which we present in four main sections. In the
first section, we explore the means by which
Cambodian elites consolidated control over a
vast swath of the border region and the role of local brokers in recruiting Vietnamese tenant
farmers and mediating their access to the land.
In three subsequent sections, we describe the
ways in which Vietnamese migrants seek to overcome their mediated access to land and counter
the ever-present threat of exclusion; these include
negotiating informal arrangements with local villagers as a means of preventing theft, developing
friendly relationships with border guards to facilitate cross-border travel and cultivating direct ties
with absentee landlords to block an attempted
eviction.

Literature review: Access, exclusion and land
brokerage along borders
The inter-related concepts of ‘access’ and
‘exclusion’, which we derive from critical
property theory, form the heart of our analytical approach. Access, as deﬁned by Ribot and
Peluso (2003: 153) is the ‘ability to beneﬁt from
things’, including land and other resources. The
‘means, processes and relations by which actors
… gain, control and maintain access’ (Ribot and
Peluso, 2003: 160) are diverse, including formal
mechanisms such as property rights and informal
or extra-legal ‘mechanisms, structures and relations’, such as identity and status, social relations,
material wealth and capital, physical proximity
and even outright ‘coercion or trickery’ (Ribot,
1998: 310). While de jure property relations thus
provide one means or mechanism by which one
may lay claim to land, one’s de facto ability to derive beneﬁts from land rests upon a much broader
web of social relations. Sarah Berry (1993: 15), for
example, demonstrates that African farmers – regardless of the legal status of their tenure – invest
heavily in the ‘establish[ing] or strengthen[ing]
the social identities and relationships’ through
which de facto land access is negotiated. As
she notes elsewhere, ‘to make and exercise
claims’ on land, it is not enough to simply possess a title, contract or other documentation of
208

de jure property rights; rather, one must ‘develop and sustain relations with other people’
(Berry, 2001: xxvi).
‘Exclusion’, on the other hand, provides the
conceptual counterpoint to access, encompassing
‘the way that people are prevented from beneﬁtting from things’ (Hall et al., 2011: 7). Access and
exclusion represent two sides of the same social relationship, and just as access may be exercised
through an array of mechanisms, powers of exclusion are also diffuse; even those who do not possess any legal rights to a resource may still be
able to prevent others from beneﬁting from that resource. Because the actual dynamics of access
and exclusion cannot be deduced from the formal
sphere of law and property rights, understanding
them requires rigorous empirical study. This is
especially true, as Hall et al. (2011: 16) note, in
Southeast Asia, where ‘the rules ostensibly
governing land access and exclusion … often bear
only the most tenuous relationship to reality’, and
‘fuzzy zones of compromise, accommodation
and bribery are the rule rather than the exception’.
Tensions over access to resources – especially
land – are most acute where distinct sociopolitical conﬁgurations, and thus competing access regimes, meet. Such tensions are pervasive
along the internal margins of Southeast Asian
states, from the outer islands of Indonesia (Li,
2002) to the highlands of central Vietnam (Tan,
2000) and northeastern Cambodia (Gironde
and Peeters, 2015). In such contexts, local traditions of customary and communal tenure run up
against notions of individualised property rights,
brought by both state actors and domestic migrants seeking land for commodity agriculture.
While this conﬂict often results in the displacement of indigenous or customary tenure regimes, this is not always the case. For example,
Koczberski et al. (2009) ﬁnd that in Papua
New Guinea, migrants to the highlands have
often failed in their efforts to push aside existing
tenure practices and acquire land for oil palm
on a freehold basis; instead, migrants have had
to adapt to the principle that land exchanges
are ‘grounded in social relationships … in accordance with traditional rules and expectations’ in
order to maintain ‘stable relationships with their
host communities and ongoing access to land’
(Koczberski et al., 2009: 38).
These tensions can be even more acute along
international borders. Border regions are
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characterised by the existence of multiple access
regimes, both de jure and de facto, often resulting
in an ‘overwhelming sense of uncertainty, insecurity and confusion’ (Cons, 2007: 21) and creating
the conditions for ‘small border chiefs’ to monopolise control over key resources, access to which
they dole out to kin and clients (Sturgeon, 2005).
Likewise, border authorities can control the
movement of goods and people across frontiers,
allowing them to collect rents from those who
engage in cross-border livelihoods. In the face of
this arbitrary exercise of exclusionary power, residents of border regions often take active steps to
maintain access to resources. Ethnic Hmong
traders along the China–Vietnam border, for
example, access markets on both sides of the
frontier through the mobilisation of kinship ties,
linguistic abilities and connections to local authorities (Schoenberger and Turner, 2008), while
ethnic Tai and Akha farmers in China access land
in Laos for rubber production through ‘kinship
ties and … patronage relations’ (Sturgeon, 2013:
71). Such strategies, however, are only open to
those who come from the border regions themselves and who can thus rely on pre-existing ties,
reservoirs of social and cultural capital or familiarity with the physical and political geography
to gain and maintain access to resources. For
migrants from more distant regions, however,
often the only viable alternative is to go through
an intermediary or broker to access land and livelihood opportunities across borders.
‘Brokerage’, as deﬁned by Stovel and Shaw
(2012: 141), refers to ‘the process of connecting actors in systems of social, economic or political relations in order to facilitate access to valued
resources’. Brokers frequently inhabit an interstitial
space between distinct social groups and through
that position are able to bridge intergroup gaps
and thus facilitate the ﬂow of goods, information,
opportunities or knowledge. Despite this facilitative
role, brokerage also has a dark or exploitative side;
brokers may effectively monopolise the supply of a
valuable resource, forcing other actors to go
through them in order to gain access and using their
‘structurally advantageous position’ to set prices
and reap proﬁts (Stovel and Shaw, 2012: 145).
While brokers exist in all facets of social life,
two forms of brokerage are relevant to the discussion of cross-border livelihoods as follows: land
brokerage and migration brokerage. Land brokers
serve as intermediaries between buyers and sellers

(or landlords and tenants), mobilising social connections across group boundaries and access to
information about land supply and demand to facilitate transactions. The more barriers in a market
– such as information asymmetries or physical and
social distance between buyers and sellers – the
more important the facilitative role of the broker
is (Sud, 2014). As in any form of brokerage, there
are strong temptations for land brokers to ‘corrupt’
the functioning of land markets; as Sud notes
(2014: 603), the Indian land brokers that he studied often resorted to ‘violence and deception’ in
their attempts to monopolise the supply of land
and derive the largest possible beneﬁt from their
structural position.
In a similar fashion, migration brokers play an
important role in facilitating migrants’ mobility
across borders and their access to livelihoods
in their destination. This facilitative role, however, is tempered by vast asymmetries in access
to information and to political authority between migrants and brokers, creating conditions
for dependence and exploitation (Kern and
Müller-Böker, 2015; Lindquist et al., 2011). In
this context of dependency, one way for migrants to mitigate their precarity is to go around
brokers, developing the knowledge and social
relations to maintain access without intermediaries (van Meetern and Pereira, 2013). Derks
(2010), for example, describes how ﬁrst-time
migrants from Cambodia to Thailand typically
rely on the services of brokers – both to facilitate
their travel across the border and to place them
in jobs – while more experienced migrants are
able to limit their dependence on such brokers
or eschew them altogether.

Case study area and research methods
Field research for this paper consisted of two trips
to the Cambodia–Vietnam border, undertaken in
November 2014 and February 2015 by the
authors and by three research assistants, Nguyen
Khiem, Pheap Sokha and Nguyen Thong Tha.
We focused primarily on a single Cambodian
border village, which we refer to here by the
pseudonym ‘Srai Saa’, in Kampot province,
conducting informal individual and group interviews with 18 local Khmer farmers and traders
(including men and women of various ages) and
11 migrant shrimp farmers from Vietnam, as well
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Figure 1. Map of the Vietnam–Cambodia border and the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. Most Vietnamese migrants in
Kampot were from Bac Lieu and Ca Mau provinces (shaded).

as the Srai Saa village chief, police chief and
border authorities. This research was supplemented by interviews with seven Vietnamese
farmers and shrimp traders just across the border
in Ha Tien, an interview with a ﬁshery ofﬁcial in
the provincial capital of Kampot, and by surveys
and group interviews on the economic and social
dynamics of shrimp farming in Bac Lieu province,
Vietnam, the home province of many of the
migrants that we interviewed. We were also able
to interview a local land broker (referred to here
by the pseudonym ‘Sokun’) who served as the
main mediator among the migrants, landowners
and border authorities.
Our research site lies a short distance from a
major border crossing and is linked by major
roads to Phnom Penh, Kep, Kampot and the
nearby city of Ha Tien in Vietnam. Most people
in this large village (population of around 700
families) cultivate a single crop of rain-fed rice
per year, and some households own chamkar
farming land on which they grow fruit and graze
buffalo and cattle. There are limited wage
labour opportunities in the village, and many
210

young people cross the border daily for work
in construction or in factories in Vietnam.
The village itself is bisected by a canal, which
separates the main residential and rice-growing
area from the shrimp farms of the Vietnamese
migrants. In total, there are about 100 Vietnamese
shrimp farmers in the village; most are men, but
we also met married couples, some with children.
The total area of shrimp ponds was estimated by
locals and Vietnamese migrants at about
1300 ha, with individual farms ranging in size
from 7 to 30 ha. The shrimp farming area itself is
a wide expanse of saltwater ponds, surrounded
by dirt embankments. The area has no roads but
is crosshatched by canals, on the banks of which
lie the thatched huts of the Vietnamese migrants.
Every migrant household we visited had at least
one small boat, which they use to both get around
their immediate environs and to make frequent
trips back across the border to Vietnam. The
border is only minutes away by boat and is
bisected at multiple places by canals, which ﬂow
into the Giang Thanh river and provide easy
access to the city of Ha Tien in Vietnam.
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Consolidating elite control and brokering
access to the borderlands
In this section, we investigate the means by
which a small group of Cambodian elites excluded local villagers from land to which they
once exercised customary access, and the
mechanisms well-connected local authorities
used to establish themselves as intermediaries
between the elite landowners and the Vietnamese
migrants who rent the land.
In Srai Saa village, the land currently being
used by the Vietnamese for shrimp farming was
once covered with ﬂooded forests of salt-tolerant
melaleuca (smach in Khmer).2 Villagers previously used the land for wood for construction
and ﬁrewood, as well as grazing land for water
buffalo, although most villagers referred to the
land as ‘wasteland’ [dae tok jowl] because it
was not suitable for rice farming.3 One farmer
told us, ‘we couldn’t do rice farming there because the soil was too salty. It was forest land with
small trees. We used it for ﬁrewood amongst the
families here. And sometimes people gathered
the wood to construct small houses and sheds’.
Some households converted small plots of forest
land to shrimp ponds in the late 1990s, but these
efforts at aquaculture were unsuccessful, largely
because the farmers had no experience in shrimp
farming nor the ﬁnancial and material resources
to prepare the land and maintain ponds.
In the mid-2000s, however, commune and
provincial-level authorities seized the ﬂooded
forest land on behalf of a group of businessmen
in Phnom Penh and high-ranking provincial police. Villagers in Srai Saa describe how the land
deals took place without their knowledge; one
local shop owner said a four-wheel drive vehicle, containing local authorities and a few outsiders whom he did not recognise, pulled up to
survey the land. When villagers gathered at the
land and asked what the ofﬁcials were doing,
they were told that this was state land and they
did not have rights to it: ‘Everyone had to agree.
The authorities said it was state land, so if we
agreed to sell they would give us some compensation, and if we didn’t agree to sell they would
take it anyway’. An elderly man suggested that
‘we couldn’t do anything because it was the nayk
mien [wealthy elite] behind [the land deal]’.
In this way, a small number of elites mobilised
their own social ties with personalised networks

of political and economic authority to assert
control over a large swath of ﬂooded forest land.
In the face of a powerful coalition of local and
central authorities, and vast inequalities in access
to information, political networks and money,
most villagers in Srai Saa felt they could do little
to resist this land grab. Some villagers did complain to local authorities and were able to eventually achieve limited recognition for their claims in
the form of modest compensation payments.
Those who lived near the ﬂooded forest or who
had previously attempted shrimp farming on the
land (ten local families) were compensated at
the rate of $USD250 per hectare if they agreed
to ‘sell’ their land to local authorities, although
they were only allowed to claim 2 ha per family
member. Others who used the land for grazing
and collecting wood but had not previously cultivated the land received no compensation.
However, one local village landowner and
commune council member, Sokun, managed
to maintain access – not to the land itself, but
to the ability to beneﬁt from that land – by cultivating new social relationships with the landowners. Sokun had strong connections in
Vietnam; he could speak Vietnamese, travelled
frequently across the border and had seen ﬁrsthand the money that could be made from the
shrimp boom (and had even tried – unsuccessfully
– to farm shrimp on the land himself), so he used
his clout as a commune councillor to acquire the
phone number of one of the new landowners in
Phnom Penh:
I called him and said … that this land is perfect for
raising shrimp, and I would look after it for him, I
would get Vietnamese farmers to rent the land
and prepare the land for him. … He agreed, so I
organised the land clearing and he paid for the
proper ponds to be dug and the canals.

In essence, Sokun set himself up as a broker
and on-the-ground supervisor for the absentee
landowners, overseeing the clearance of the forests and the conversion of the land to shrimp
ponds before turning his attention to the recruitment of Vietnamese migrants to work the land.
The ﬁrst of these migrants arrived in 2007, and
the migrant population reached its current extent
by about 2010. Most of these migrants come not
from the immediate vicinity but from distant provinces such as Ca Mau and Bac Lieu, and none of
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the migrants we spoke to had any prior experience in Cambodia. Some had heard about the
availability of land in Srai Saa from family members and neighbours in their home provinces,
while others had simply chanced upon the opportunity. As one shrimp farmer from Ca Mau explained to us, ‘I went to [the Vietnamese border
city of] Ha Tien to visit friends and someone told
me about the cheap land. So I crossed the border
to see’. He soon met with Sokun, with whom he
signed a contract for a 30-ha plot.
Once established in Srai Saa, these Vietnamese
migrants engaged in the extensive production
of marine species such as black tiger prawn
(Penaeus monodon) and whiteleg shrimp
(Litopenaeus vannamei) in brackish ponds.4
These migrants had typically engaged in such
forms of extensive aquaculture in their home
provinces, and thus, survey data collected in
May 2014 by the primary author in a village
in Bac Lieu province, Vietnam, where extensive
shrimp farming is the main form of livelihood,
provides some insight into the economic pressures that drive such farmers to Cambodia.5 Of
the 324 households surveyed in this village, 241
were engaged in shrimp farming. Most households cultivated between 0.5 and 2.5 ha of
shrimp ponds, with the median shrimp farming
household having a pond area of 1.296 ha. Of
those households engaged in shrimp farming,
18.26% (n = 44) had lost money in the previous
year; among those who had made money
(n = 197), the median proﬁt per hectare was just
15.53m Vietnam Dong or approximately
$USD740. In a country where the average per
capita income now exceeds $USD2000 per year,
the returns from extensive shrimp farming on relatively small plots are – as many farmers told us
– simply not enough to support a family. Many
rely on other sources of supplementary income,
such as remittances from relatives working in
the industrial zones of Binh Duong and Dong
Nai, northeast of Ho Chi Minh City.
Vietnamese shrimp farmers looking to expand
the size of their operations are, however,
constrained by the high price of land. A hectare
of land suitable for shrimp farming in Bac Lieu
costs between $USD10 000 to $USD20 000,
far outstripping the savings of most farmers.
While land is also available to rent, the typical
rental fee ranges from about 7 to 10m Vietnam
Dong (or approximately $USD300 to $USD500)
212

per hectare per year, representing the lion’s share
of the typical agricultural surplus. In Cambodia,
by comparison, land was available in large quantities and at a comparatively low price; the
farmers that we talked to typically rented between
7 and 15 ha through Sokun and paid on average
$USD125 per hectare per year. As one farmer effused, ‘the land here [in Cambodia] is very expansive. Here you can get a big piece of land and you
can grow a lot of shrimp. If your shrimp succeed,
you can make a lot of money. But in Vietnam the
land is small, and it’s very expensive’. Not only
was the land cheaper and more abundant than
in Vietnam but it was relatively unspoiled, having
previously been covered with ﬂooded forest. According to one shrimp farmer from Bac Lieu, the
land in his home province was ‘old’ and had been
used continuously for shrimp farming over many
years. In Cambodia, by contrast, the land was
‘new’ and produced higher yields with fewer disease outbreaks.
While the Vietnamese migrants may have
been pushed outward by economic pressures –
chief among them high land prices – in their
home country, they arrived in Srai Saa in a position of advantage relative to the Khmer inhabitants of the village. The Vietnamese typically
have experience and expertise in shrimp aquaculture and are able to access markets for inputs
and outputs across the border in Ha Tien. Most
signiﬁcantly, however, they are able to mobilise
signiﬁcant reserves of capital, chieﬂy by selling
or mortgaging their modest land holdings in
Vietnam (and in the process using the high price
of land to their advantage). One shrimp farmer
from Kien Giang province explained that he
had ﬁnanced the rental of 8 ha of land in
Cambodia and the requisite investments in
shrimp stock and other inputs by mortgaging
0.8 ha of land in Vietnam for approximately
$USD6000. According to another migrant from
Bac Lieu, one needed ‘at least’ 100m Vietnam
Dong, or approximately $USD5000, in capital
to start a shrimp farm in Cambodia, a sum far
beyond what the typical inhabitant of Srai Saa
could muster.
Despite their ability to mobilise capital, expertise and market linkages to establish relatively large extensive shrimp farms along the
Cambodian border land, migrants were now reliant on a single broker to provide access to their
most crucial resource: land. Most never met, or
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even knew the names of, the ultimate owners of
the land that they rented through Sokun and received only handwritten contracts (in Khmer)
from the broker as proof of this arrangement.
For his role as intermediary, Sokun kept a portion of the rental fees paid by the Vietnamese,
an arrangement that has brought him obvious
enrichment; he now has the largest house in
the village, a new car and several plots of land.
However, for the migrants, the brokered nature
of their access and their dependence on Sokun
brought signiﬁcant risks, as would soon become
clear.

Challenging theft and forging social ties
While Vietnamese migrants gained access to
land in Cambodia through market means, paying Sokun in exchange for documents that
promised the exclusive use of certain parcels,
they found the day-to-day reality of access quite
different. The ability of farmers to access and
beneﬁt from land, as Hall et al. (2011) note, is
predicated on ‘some assurance that other people
will not seize their farms or steal their crops’.
Upon arriving in Cambodia, however, the Vietnamese migrants soon found their access to their
rented aquaculture land impinged upon by the
theft of shrimp. Theft is a form of unauthorised

or illicit access (Ribot, 1998: 310), here
representing a strategy by certain elements of
the Cambodian population to retain some ability
to beneﬁt from lands from which they had been
excluded. This phenomenon – by no means
unique to the Cambodian borderlands6 – demonstrates that even people without property
rights or legal claim to a parcel can still exercise
some everyday powers of exclusion, denying
others the ability to beneﬁt from the land itself
by accessing and using it in an illicit way.
In Vietnam, the migrants explained that they
could simply call the police and report such
theft. In Cambodia, however, they did not know
what to do. ‘We don’t know the authorities’, one
told us, ‘and they don’t speak Vietnamese anyway’. Even though Sokun charged a ‘security
fee’ of approximately $USD2 per month for
each hut occupied by the Vietnamese and could
in theory serve as a means of accessing the police or relevant authorities, the farmers we spoke
with said that he was uninterested or unable to
help. As one of the female migrants scoffed:
‘The security fee! I don’t even know what that’s
for’. The challenge facing the Vietnamese migrants thus stemmed not just from theft itself
but from the role of Sokun in mediating their
access to local political authority – and from
his inability or unwillingness to mobilise the
police or other ofﬁcials in defence of migrants’

Figure 2. A contract between a Vietnamese migrant and the land broker
© 2016 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
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access claims. Farmers that we spoke to had,
however, developed an alternative means of
dealing with the problem and ensuring their access to their shrimp stocks, one which partially
bypassed the middleman and worked through
the cultivation of direct social relations with
Khmer villagers in the surrounding area.
Building off their day-to-day interactions with
local villagers, many of whom were capable of
speaking Vietnamese from cross-border sojourns
as traders and labourers, the migrants established
informal access arrangements with their Khmer
neighbours, permitting the Khmer to harvest
certain resources from the shrimp ponds while
circumscribing other activities, especially those
which would negatively impact upon their capacity to beneﬁt. The terms of this agreement
were simple. As a local Khmer woman explained
while ﬁshing from the banks of a migrant shrimp
pond, the Vietnamese permit the villagers to ﬁsh
for certain varieties of ‘natural’ ﬁsh. Unlike the
shrimp that farmers actively stock and cultivate,
these saltwater ﬁsh, called M’rick’ ﬁsh (‘American’ ﬁsh), are simply carried into the ponds
when farmers take in seawater for shrimp cultivation and are abundant and easy to catch. As
she told us: ‘Anyone can ﬁsh here, as long as
they know the owner. If he knows our face, it’s
okay’. The Vietnamese, however, generally
prohibited ﬁshing for a brief period after stocking
their ponds, in order to prevent the inadvertent
harvesting of shrimp fry.
These arrangements – lubricated by friendly
face-to-face interactions and by the development of bonds of trust between migrants and locals – have been generally successful, both in
preventing thefts and minimising the time and
resources that the Vietnamese must invest in
monitoring their ponds.7 Indeed, many of the
migrants spend large portions of the day across
the border in Ha Tien or at the huts of other
Vietnamese, eating and drinking, while local
Khmer ﬁsh their ponds unmonitored. Theft,
however, has not been totally eliminated, but
the perpetrators are thought to come from outside
the immediate village. As one shrimp farmer explained, ‘the local Cambodians are very kind.
They sometimes come to catch ﬁsh to eat … but
Khmer from the other village are bad. They sometimes come and tamper with our ﬁelds’. This
comment, and the ongoing phenomenon of pond
theft to which it refers, illustrates the limit of face214

to-face negotiation as a way of gaining and maintaining access in the face of everyday exclusion.
Such a strategy, while partially effective at overcoming the vulnerability inherent in migrants’
mediated access to police and other political
authorities, does nothing to protect their access
claims against encroachment from outsiders with
whom they have not developed such social ties
and bonds of trust.

Negotiating mediated access on the border
For all intents and purposes, the area inhabited
by the Vietnamese shrimp farmers serves as a
Vietnamese economic enclave. The Vietnamese
we spoke to purchased nearly all of their everyday necessities, such as food, drinking water,
ice, gasoline, alcohol and cigarettes, across the
border in Ha Tien.8 During the day, the cafes
and small shops that line the canals just across
the border teem with Vietnamese migrants, and
many keep motorbikes in storage at these cafes
for frequent trips home to Ca Mau, Bac Lieu
and elsewhere in the Mekong Delta.
Ha Tien is also the place where Vietnamese
purchase inputs such as shrimp stock, antibiotics,
feed and lime (for the neutralisation of acidic water) and where they sell their harvested output.
Because shrimp is extremely perishable and
because extensively farmed shrimp can be
harvested on a regular (typically monthly) basis
throughout the year, it is vital for shrimp farmers
to have ready access to markets for their produce
(Hall, 2004). Most shrimp are packed in ice (also
sourced in Ha Tien) for transport across the border
to buyers and middlemen who congregate at the
canal-side cafes and transport purchased shrimp
to the Ha Tien wholesale seafood market. Some
migrants have installed oxygenated tanks on their
boats, enabling them to transport live shrimp that
fetch a higher price and are typically destined for
the restaurant market in Ho Chi Minh City.
Migrants’ ability to beneﬁt from the shrimp
ponds in Cambodia is thus dependent not just
on their access to land but also on their crossborder mobility and the movement of inputs
and outputs both into and out of Cambodia.
Such crossings are thus both a routine, everyday
exercise for the Vietnamese and one that exposes them to potential exclusion. This potential
for exclusion is exacerbated by the ambiguity
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surrounding the legality of the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and their economic activities
there; few of the Vietnamese we met possessed
valid passports, and none had visas or other ofﬁcial paperwork permitting them to reside or
work in Cambodia. Meanwhile, the ofﬁcials
we spoke to in Cambodia professed ignorance
as to the numbers of Vietnamese migrants in
the border provinces, their status and the legality
of their land rentals.
The pervasive ambiguity of the border zone –
and of the migrant presence in Cambodia – is
facilitated by the region’s physical geography;
while there is a large land crossing not far from
Srai Saa, the lack of road connections to the
shrimp farming area meant that travel by boat
was simpler. This method was not only more
convenient but brought the migrants past isolated border posts that were manned (albeit
infrequently) by a small assortment of border
guards. The remote nature of these posts, in
contrast to the more closely supervised land
crossing, enabled the cultivation of informal
understandings and friendly relations between
guards and migrants. In our visits to migrant
shrimp ponds, we often encountered members
of the Cambodian border patrol drinking and
eating with the Vietnamese, particularly around
Tet, the Vietnamese lunar new year. Some border
agents were ﬂuent in Vietnamese, which facilitated the development of social ties.
Such investments in friendly relations with the
border agents thus represented one strategy of
access maintenance among the Vietnamese migrants, but the wheels of access were not simply
greased by food, drink and friendly conversation
alone. Rather, the Vietnamese made annual payments – totalling several hundred US dollars per
household per year – in exchange for the ability
to cross the border unfettered. These payments,
however, ﬂowed not to the individual border
agents themselves but to Sokun, who supposedly
distributed these payments among the local border posts and paid off more senior authorities
higher up the chain of command. In exchange
for these payments, the migrants received handwritten documents, little more than scraps of
notebook paper, which they referred to as their
‘passports’ or ‘visas’ (using the English terms).
Written in Khmer, and thus unintelligible to the
Vietnamese, these documents were actually receipts of payment for ‘boarding fees’, signed by

Sokun. The standard fee was $USD200 for each
adult male household head per year and
$USD100 for a spouse or other adult family member, although this ﬁgure varied. The Vietnamese
reported that these documents also permitted
them to transport aquaculture inputs and consumer goods across the border, as well as small
quantities of shrimp. Those who transported
larger amounts of shrimp (as by collecting shrimp
from neighbours for sale in Ha Tien) had to pay
for another permit, which cost about $USD150
per year. The migrants, however, reported paying
no fees to the Vietnamese border patrol, either for
crossing or transporting goods.
Within a context of pervasive ambiguity, the
Vietnamese migrants have managed to negotiate
seemingly stable access arrangements, facilitated by the regular payment of informal fees
to Sokun, who, in turn, provides unofﬁcial paperwork authorising their residency status, trading on
his own social ties with higher levels of authority
to provide a personal guarantee of unfettered passage across the border. These documents, however, do not convey any ofﬁcial recognition or
authorisation for the Vietnamese presence from
the central government of Cambodia, and the
threat of deportation remains a very real one for
migrants. While the Vietnamese cultivate friendly
ties with individual border patrol agents, they rely
upon Sokun to mediate their interactions with
higher level authorities, much as he mediates
their rental contracts with the landowners. By
consolidating so many ‘strands’ (Ribot and
Peluso, 2003) of access control in his own hands,
Sokun has come to comprise a key node through
which migrant access to land – and access to the
political authorities who ultimately control such
land access – ﬂows, enriching himself in the process but ultimately reinforcing the precarity of the
Vietnamese by enmeshing them in relations of
dependence.

Renegotiating the terms of access and
bypassing the middleman
The roots of the Vietnamese migrants’ precarity
thus lay not simply in their ambiguous legal
status but in their reliance on a single node –
indeed, a single person – to mediate their access
to land and authority. Although the Vietnamese
attempted to mitigate their reliance on Sokun

© 2016 Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd

215

T. Gorman and A. Beban

Figure 3. A Vietnamese farmer shows us the ‘passport’ he received from Sokun

through their cultivation of horizontal social ties
with local Khmer villagers and friendly relations
with border guards, the power imbalance
between Sokun and the Vietnamese remained evident, as he used his position to extract increasing
rents and informal payments.
Shortly before we began our research, many
of the initial 5-year rental contracts had expired,
and the Vietnamese migrants had signed new
agreements with Sokun. They complained, however, that the rental price had increased signiﬁcantly, from $USD100 per hectare to $USD125,
and they suspected that Sokun was simply
pocketing the difference. Between the rent and
the passport and security fees that Sokun also collected, the cost of access for migrants was steadily
rising, to the apparent beneﬁt of the broker. As
one Vietnamese farmer complained: ‘These fees
are enough to kill us. I’ve paid all kinds of money
to Sokun. He’ll give you no peace until you pay’.
Just a few months after signing these new contracts and collecting the ﬁrst year’s lease payment, Sokun began calling the migrants with a
surprising ultimatum. The Cambodian government, he claimed, planned to deport them. They
had 10 days to leave voluntarily, after which they
would be evicted from the land and forced to
leave the country. We arrived for our ﬁrst research
trip just days after this announcement to ﬁnd the
Vietnamese outraged. ‘I came to Cambodia in
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2010’, one migrant explained. ‘I rent 22 hectares
here, and I pay my rent regularly to Sokun. He
asked me to pay until March 2015, and I did.
Now [November 2014] he wants me to remove
my hut and to leave in 10 days. He drives us away
without any warning’. Another complained of the
injustice of the situation: ‘it’s like we ate one dish
but had to pay for two. We paid for a year, but he
only allows us to farm for ﬁve months and then
makes a complete about-face like this’.
This anger was tempered by uncertainty over
the ambiguity of the situation and anxiety over
the future. Whether or not Sokun was trying to
cheat the Vietnamese or simply conveying a
new policy directive from the central or provincial government in his role as a commune authority, few doubted his capacity to call upon
the coercive power of the state to carry out the
threat of deportation. Rumours swirled around
us, and some Vietnamese reported that Sokun
had ordered Cambodian border police they did
not know to block the migrants returning from
Ha Tien, while others claimed that they were
not border guards at all but came from a ‘higher
level’ of the police or military. As the clock ticked
towards the impending deadline, the Vietnamese
grew anxious. They were well aware of the antiVietnamese violence that had recently erupted
in Phnom Penh, and Sokun seems to have stoked
their fears, telling them that Sam Rainsy (the
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opposition leader and proponent of antiVietnamese nationalism) and his party were orchestrating their eviction.
While the migrants faced the threat of a violent eviction if they stayed in Cambodia, they
risked losing everything if they left. As one
shrimp farmer explained, ‘people are crying, because they they’ve put a lot of money into their
ponds, and they haven’t even harvested yet.
And if they have to go home, they have nothing.
They’ve mortgaged their land or sold it to come
here’. When we asked him what he would do if
he had to go back to Vietnam, he just shook his
head. ‘I mortgaged all my land’, he said, ‘but I
guess I can go to Ho Chi Minh City or to Binh
Duong [an industrial area in southeast Vietnam]
and try to ﬁnd work there’.
The Vietnamese were eager to show us their
paperwork, their rental contracts and handwritten
passports, authorising them to stay in Cambodia,
all emblazoned with Sokun’s signature. What he
was doing, they argued, was ‘inappropriate’ and
‘illegal’, but they had no means to force him to
honour the agreements he had signed, no obvious
authority to which they could appeal. As one
shrimp farmer later told us, Sokun ‘is the authority.
We are friends with some of the Khmer, but they’re
just normal people. He’s the person we have to go
through if we have a problem’. ‘We want the Cambodian government to intervene and solve this situation’, another told us, ‘but it is very hard
because we live in a foreign land, and we have
no knowledge of Cambodian law and we don’t
speak Khmer’. This frustration illustrates the fundamental weakness of migrant land users; adrift in an
unfamiliar context, they must work through brokers who mediate their relation to land and authority and thus have little recourse when these
brokers themselves attempt to exploit them. 9
To resolve the situation favourably and preserve their ability to access land in Cambodia,
the migrants would thus need to go over Sokun’s
head and establish their own direct relationships
with those in positions of greater power and
authority. After some effort, some migrants were
able to make contact with one of the major landowners for whom Sokun served as a broker.
Four of these migrants travelled to the provincial
capital in Kampot city, where the landowner
occupied a senior government post. The landowner, who spoke some Vietnamese, explained
that he did not know anything of Sokun’s

ultimatum and informed them that they were
free to stay in Srai Saa and ﬁnish out their contracts. He advised them to come and speak to
him directly if the migrants needed any documents or encountered any problems along the
border; as a senior provincial ofﬁcial, he promised to ensure their continued access to their
rented plots through his own extensive ties with
the border authorities. Some migrants have
since begun making their rental payments to
him directly, bypassing Sokun.
In this manner, the Vietnamese tenants were
ultimately able to overcome the attempted
exclusion initiated by Sokun by bypassing him
and establishing direct, personal ties with one
of the major landowners, who also happened
to occupy a position of political authority and
thus could serve as a more powerful guarantor
of their mobility and protector of their access
claims. By doing so, they strengthened their
access to the land and ameliorated some of the
precarity surrounding their position as migrant
land users. However, the fundamental basis of
that precarity remains unchanged; the landlord
could still evict them at will, and they would
have no recourse to any higher authority. Sokun
remained in the picture, and most of the
Vietnamese continued to make their rent
payments directly to him, just as they had in
the past. In light of this episode, some of the
Vietnamese expressed lingering uncertainty as
to just how long they would be permitted to
stay in Cambodia.
These fears may ultimately prove wellfounded. On our last day of research, Sokun
produced a map of the area, carefully unfolding
it to show us a small area demarcated in yellow
highlighter. Srai Saa and the surrounding area,
he explained, would soon be designated a special economic zone. With that designation, he
claimed, would come infrastructural improvements and foreign investment. ‘Now everything
is changing’, he said excitedly. ‘I heard that they
are getting electricity in here soon. There is a
Malaysian company putting in capital, and
companies from China too. They plan to do intensive shrimp farming here’. The Vietnamese
would have no place within this proposed
arrangement. ‘They [the landowners] will kick
out all the Vietnamese farmers soon’, claimed
Sokun. ‘Soon they will all be gone’. Whether
or not this prediction comes to pass, it speaks
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to both the fundamental precarity of migrants’
access to land and to the region-wide trend of
establishing special economic zones along borders (Eilenberg, 2014), opening up, in the process, new opportunities for enterprising brokers
such as Sokun.

Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored dynamics of access and exclusion as they play out along the
Cambodian border with Vietnam. As we have
shown, a small number of well-connected elites
were able to exclude the local villagers from
what was once ﬂooded forest and to consolidate
control over a wide swath of land near the border. These absentee landlords, in turn, entrusted
day-to-day control over the land to a local broker, Sokun, who oversaw the transformation of
the land to shrimp ponds and the recruitment
of Vietnamese migrants to cultivate these ponds.
In the process, he became a key node through
which the access of the Vietnamese to both land
and political authority was mediated. Even after
making these initial agreements with Sokun,
however, the Vietnamese have still struggled to
gain and maintain day-to-day access to the
ponds that they have rented, and thus, we explored the various strategies that they have
employed to mitigate the threat of exclusion: In
the face of theft, they negotiated mutually agreeable arrangements that preserved the access of
local villagers to their ponds and to certain resources; in response to the pervasive ambiguity
around their status as cross-border migrants,
they have both purchased unofﬁcial residency
permits through Sokun and cultivated friendly
ties with the local border guards, and ﬁnally, in
the face of an attempt at exclusion by Sokun,
they took steps to mitigate the inherent precarity
of their mediated access by establishing direct
ties with the landowners themselves.
In developing this case study, we have sought
to make a contribution to emerging literature on
cross-border livelihoods. While the phenomenon
of large-scale cross-border land acquisitions – or
‘land grabs’ – has received ample study, relatively
little scholarly attention has been paid to the role
of individual farmers who engage in international
migration for the purposes of accessing land for
production. Our intention, through the present
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case study, is to examine such cross-border livelihoods through the lens of land access and to argue that there are circumstances – such as the
reliance on intermediaries, the inability to invoke
politico-legal authority and a lack of existing social ties in their new contexts – particular to migrants that render them particularly susceptible
to exclusion. What we have found here, on the
Cambodian borderlands, is that Vietnamese migrants have strived to ameliorate these underlying
sources of precarity and strengthen their access to
land through the active cultivation of new social
relations; whether such relations will be enough
to maintain their access over the long term in
such a dynamic environment, however, remains
to be seen.
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Notes
1 We focus speciﬁcally on the experiences of Vietnamese
enants rather than the general insecurity faced by Cambodian land users in a context where violent evictions
are commonplace (Le Billon, 2010). This is not to discount the insecurity of local people but to highlight the
particular factors that contribute to the precarity of migrant land access. This focus on migrant precarity also
counterbalances the tendency of the Cambodian press
to portray Vietnamese farmers as powerful land grabbers
(Un, 2015).
2 These plants are often called ‘rear mangrove’ and play a
signiﬁcant role in maintaining ecosystem function by
minimising ﬂooding in the wet season, promoting biodiversity of aquatic organisms and providing a source of
wood (Theilade et al., 2011).
3 Their dismissal of the land as ‘wasteland’ during interviews may be because of the central importance of rice
farming for village livelihoods (which renders other
land less valuable) and may also reﬂect people’s frustrations at their unsuccessful attempts to cultivate
shrimp on the land or their anger that the land was
taken from them.
4 Extensive shrimp farming, as practised in the study area
and in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, utilises purchased
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5

6

7

8

9

shrimp fry stocked at relatively low densities, as well
as limited applications of fertiliser to promote the
growth of organisms that provide feed for the shrimp.
Intensive shrimp farming, which is also widely practised in the Mekong Delta, entails a higher degree of
technological sophistication and higher capital outlays, making use of higher stocking densities, purchased feed and mechanically operated pumps and
fans to aerate ponds.
In fact, a number of shrimp farmers from this particular village have travelled to Cambodia to rent land,
which is how the phenomenon originally came to
our attention.
Hong Anh Vu (2011: 274–275), for example, writes that
theft is a signiﬁcant problem for relatively wealthy migrants with intensive shrimp ponds in Tra Vinh, Vietnam.
In Koh Kong province, Cambodia, Marschke (2012 describes the theft of crab traps as a major constraint on
the livelihoods of coastal ﬁsherfolk.
This informal access regime resembles, in part, the
emergence of informal, self-organised institutions
around the governance of common-pool resources
(Ostrom, 1990), particularly in the co-existence of
multiple users, each with a deﬁned set of rights to resources and restrictions upon resource use (Ostrom
and Schlager, 1996).
One migrant even cut short our interview to pick up
his teenage daughter from school in Ha Tien and bring
her back to the family’s hut in Cambodia by boat,
demonstrating the extent to which migrants’ everyday
lives depend upon their unimpeded cross-border
mobility.
Faced with little avenue for redress on the Cambodian
side, some of the migrants instead petitioned the Vietnamese border patrol for help. In Ha Tien, we watched
as one migrant informed a Vietnamese ofﬁcial of their
plight; the ofﬁcial was willing to help but said he could
do little but contact his Cambodian counterpart in
Kampot. He did, however, advise the Vietnamese to acquire proper passports.
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